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We propose a general method for studying properties of quantum channels acting on an n-partite
system, whose action is invariant under permutations of the subsystems. Our main result is that, in order to
prove that a certain property holds for an arbitrary input, it is sufficient to consider the case where the input
is a particular de Finetti-type state, i.e., a state which consists of n identical and independent copies of an
(unknown) state on a single subsystem. Our technique can be applied to the analysis of information-
theoretic problems. For example, in quantum cryptography, we get a simple proof for the fact that security
of a discrete-variable quantum key distribution protocol against collective attacks implies security of the
protocol against the most general attacks. The resulting security bounds are tighter than previously known
bounds obtained with help of the exponential de Finetti theorem.
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In quantum mechanics, the most general way of describ-
ing the evolution of a subsystem A (A may be part of a
larger system) at time t to a subsystem A0 at a later point in
time t0 is by application of a quantum channel.
Mathematically, a quantum channel is a completely posi-
tive trace-preserving (CPTP) map transforming the re-
duced density matrix A of system A at time t to A0 , the
reduced density matrix of system A0 at time t0. CPTP maps
are used in various areas of physics and information theory.
A CPTP map modeling a particular quantum communica-
tion channel, for instance, describes how the channel out-
put A0 depends on the input A.
A common method to characterize a given CPTP map E
is to compare it to an idealized CPTP map F that is well
understood, e.g., because it has a simple description. For
instance, given a physical communication channel speci-
fied by E, one may characterize its ability to reliably trans-
mit messages by showing its similarity to a perfect channel
F characterized by the identity mapping id. Another ex-
ample is the analysis of information-theoretic or crypto-
graphic protocols (e.g., for quantum key distribution).
Here, E may be the action of the actual protocol while F
is the ideal functionality the protocol is supposed to repro-
duce. We are then typically interested in proving that E is
almost equal to F (in quantum cryptography, this corre-
sponds to proving security).
In order to compare two CPTP maps E andF , we need a
notion of distance. A natural choice is the metric induced
by the diamond norm k  k} [1] since it is directly related
to the maximum probability that a difference can be ob-
served between the processes described by E and F ,
respectively. More precisely, consider a hypothetical
game where a player is asked to guess whether a given
physical process is described by E or F , which are both
equally likely to be the correct descriptions. If the player is
allowed to observe the process once (with an input of his
choice, possibly correlated with a reference system) then
the maximum probability p of a correct guess is given by
p ¼ 12þ 14 kE F k}. In particular, if E and F are identi-
cal, the distance equals zero and, hence, p ¼ 12 , corre-
sponding to a random guess. On the other hand, if E and
F are perfectly distinguishable, we have kE F k} ¼ 2
and p ¼ 1.
Here, we present a general method for computing an
upper bound on the distance kE F k} between two maps
E and F , provided they act symmetrically on an n-partite
system with subsystemsH of finite dimension. While, by
definition, the diamond norm involves a maximization over
all possible inputs, we show that for calculating the bound
it is sufficient to consider (relative to a reference system)
the particular input
H n ¼
Z
n
H
ðH Þ; (1)
whereðÞ is the measure on the space of density operators
on a single subsystem induced by the Hilbert-Schmidt
metric. States of the form (1) are also known as
de Finetti states. They describe the joint state of n sub-
systems prepared as identical and independent copies of an
(unknown) density operator H . Because of their struc-
ture, de Finetti states are usually easy to handle in calcu-
lations and proofs, as outlined below.
As an example, we apply this result to the security
analysis of quantum key distribution (QKD) schemes
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[3,4]. Let E be the map describing a given QKD protocol,
which takes as input n predistributed particle pairs (which
may have been generated in a preliminary protocol step).
Security of the protocol (against the most general attacks)
is then defined by the requirement that the protocol E is
close to the ideal functionality F that simply outputs a
perfect key, independently of the input (which may be
arbitrarily compromised by the action of an adversary).
Now, according to our main result, this distance is bounded
by simply evaluating the map E for an input of the form (1)
and comparing the generated key with a perfect key. We
further show that the latter is equivalent to proving security
of the scheme against a restricted type of attacks, called
collective attacks, where the adversary is assumed to attack
each of the particle pairs independently and identically.
Our result thus gives a simple proof for the statement
(proved originally in [5,6]) that security of a QKD protocol
against collective attacks implies security against the most
general attacks. The resulting security bounds are tighter
than previously known bounds obtained by proofs relying
on the exponential de Finetti theorem [5].
Main result.—Let  be a linear map from EndðH nÞ to
EndðH 0Þ. In particular,  may be the difference between
two CPTP maps. EndðLÞ denotes the space of all endo-
morphisms on L, which includes the density operators on
L. We denote by  the map on EndðH nÞ that permutes
the subsystems with permutation  [7]. Our main result,
the post-selection theorem [8], gives an upper bound on the
norm of a permutation-invariant map in terms of the action
of the map on a purification [9] H nR of the state H n
defined by (1).
Theorem 1. If for any permutation there exists a linear
CPTP mapK such that    ¼K  , then
kk}  gn;dkð  idÞðH nRÞk1:
id denotes the identity map on EndðRÞ and
gn;d ¼ nþ d
2  1
n
 
 ðnþ 1Þd21;
for d ¼ dimH .
Compared to the left-hand side of this bound, which
involves an optimization over all input states and is gen-
erally hard to evaluate, the right-hand side is significantly
easier to deal with since it only involves a single, very
specific input state.
The proof of Theorem 1 uses the following lemmawhich
relates arbitrary density operators H nKn on the symmet-
ric subspace SymnðH KÞ  ðH KÞn, for K ﬃ
H , to a particular purification of H n . We define the state
H nKn ¼
R
n
HK
dðHKÞ on SymnðH KÞ, where
dðÞ is the measure on the pure states induced by the
Haar measure on the unitary group acting on H K.
We note that H nKn extends the state H n defined in (1),
i.e., trKnH nKn ¼ H n ; the measure ðÞ furthermore is
the one induced by the Hilbert-Schmidt metric on EndðH Þ
[10]. Let now H nKnN be a purification of H nKn .
Lemma 2. For H nKn a density operator supported on
SymnðH KÞ, withK ﬃH , there exists a linear com-
pletely positive trace-nonincreasing map T from the pu-
rifying system EndðN Þ to C such that
H nKn ¼ gn;dðid T ÞðH nKnN Þ; (2)
where id is the identity map on EndððH KÞnÞ and d ¼
dimH .
Proof. Let N ﬃ SymnðH KÞ and let fjiigi be an
eigenbasis of H nKn . Since, by Schur’s lemma, H nKn is
the state proportional to the identity on SymnðH KÞ,
H nKnN :¼ jihjH nKnN is a purification of H nKn ,
where jiH nKnN :¼ gð1=2Þn;d
P
ijii  jii, and gn;d is the
dimension of SymnðH KÞ. Furthermore, for any basis
vector jii,
jiihijH nKn ¼ gn;d trN ðH nKnN 1H nKn  jiihijN Þ;
where 1H nKn 2 EndððH KÞnÞ is the identity. This
implies (2) with T :  trðN Þ, since fjiigi is an
eigenbasis of H nKn . Because T is clearly trace-
nonincreasing, this concludes the proof. h
Proof of Theorem 1.We need to show that for any finite-
dimensional spaceR0 and any density operator H nR0 ,
kð  idÞðH nR0 Þk1  gn;dkð  idÞðH nRÞk1; (3)
for some purification H nR of H n . In a first step, we show
that it is sufficient to prove (3) for density operators H nR0
with support on SymnðH KÞ, where K ﬃH and
R0 ¼Kn. To see this, let H nR0 be an arbitrary density
operator and define the density operator
H nR0R00 ¼
1
n!
X

ð  idÞðH nR0 Þ  jihjR00 ;
where the sum ranges over all permutations  of the n
subsystems and where fjig is an orthonormal fam-
ily of vectors on an auxiliary space R00. Then, by con-
struction, the reduced state H n ¼ trR0R00 ð H nR0R00 Þ is
permutation-invariant. Hence, according to [6,11], there
exists a purification H nH n of H n supported on
SymnðH KÞ. In particular, because all purifications
are equivalent up to isometries, there exists a CPTP
map G from EndðKnÞ to EndðR0 R00Þ such that
H nR0R00 ¼ ðid  GÞð H nKnÞ. Making use of the assump-
tion on the permutation-invariance of , we thus find that
kð  idÞðH nR0 Þk1 equals
1
n!
X

kðð  Þ  idÞðH nR0 Þk1 ¼ kð  idÞð H nR0R00 Þk1
¼ kð  GÞð H nKnÞk1
 kð  idÞð H nKnÞk1;
where the last inequality holds because a CPTPmap cannot
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increase the norm. It thus remains to show that (3) holds for
states H nKn in Sym
nðH KÞ. By Lemma 2 there exists
a map T such that H nKn ¼ gn;dðid T ÞðH nKnN Þ.
Then, by linearity, we have
kð  idÞðH nKnÞk1 ¼ gn;dkð T ÞðH nKnN Þk1:
Inequality (3) then follows from the fact that T cannot
increase the norm and by settingR ¼Kn N . h
Application to quantum key distribution.—QKD is the
art of generating a secret key known only to two distant
parties, Alice and Bob, connected by an insecure quantum
communication channel and an authentic classical channel
[12]. Most QKD protocols can be subdivided into two
parts. In the first, Alice and Bob use the quantum channel
to distribute n entangled particle pairs (this phase may
include advanced quantum protocols such as quantum
repeaters). In the second part, they apply local measure-
ments (we will restrict ourselves to the typical case of
measurements that are independent and identical on each
of the n pairs) followed by a sequence of classical post-
processing steps (such as parameter estimation, error cor-
rection, and privacy amplification) to extract ‘ key bits
[13]. It induces a map E from ðH A H BÞn (the n
particle pairs) to the set of pairs (SA; SB) of ‘-bit strings
(Alice and Bob’s final keys, respectively) andC, whereC is
a transcript of the classical communication. Note that ‘
may depend on the input; in particular, ‘ ¼ 0 if the entan-
glement of the initial particle pairs is too small for key
extraction.
A QKD protocol is said to be " secure (for some small
"  0) if, for any attack of an adversary, the final keys SA
and SB computed by Alice and Bob are identical, uni-
formly distributed, and independent of the adversary’s
knowledge, except with probability ". This criterion can
be reformulated as a condition on the map E. Since an
adversary may have full control over the quantum channel
connecting Alice and Bob, we require that, for any input
to E, the output is a pair (SA; SB) of secure keys of length
‘  0 [15]. To make this more precise, let S be the map
that acts on the output (SA; SB; C) of E by replacing (SA; SB)
by a pair (S0A; S
0
B) of identical and uniformly distributed
keys of the same length, while leaving C unchanged. With
this definition, the concatenated map F :¼ S  E de-
scribes an ideal key distillation scheme which always out-
puts a perfect key pair. We then say that E is " secure if
kE F k}  ".
E is typically invariant under permutations of the inputs.
However, if it is not, permutation-invariance can be en-
forced by prepending an additional symmetrization step
where both Alice and Bob permute their inputs according
to a permutation  chosen at random by one party and
communicated to the other using the classical channel [16].
We can thus apply Theorem 1 with  :¼ E F , which
implies that E is " secure whenever
kððE F Þ  idÞðH nRÞk1  " :¼ "ðnþ 1Þðd21Þ; (4)
whereH :¼H A H B, where d ¼ dimðH Þ, and where
H nR is a purification of the state H n defined by (1).
We will now employ (4) to show that for proving secur-
ity of a QKD protocol it suffices to consider collective
attacks, where the adversary acts on each of the signals
independently and identically. Using the above formalism,
we say that E is " secure against collective attacks if kððE 
F Þ  idÞðn
HK
Þk1  ", for any (pure) HK onH K,
where K ﬃH . This immediately implies that the same
bound holds for the extension H nKn ¼
R
n
HK
dðHKÞ
of H n ,
kðE F Þ  idKnðH nKnÞk1  max
HK
kðE F Þ
 idKnðnHKÞk1
 ": (5)
To obtain criterion (4), we need to show that a similar
bound still holds if we consider a purification H nKnN of
H nKn . For this, we think of N as an additional system
that is available to an adversary. BecauseN can be chosen
isomorphic to SymnðH KÞ, its dimension is bounded
by ðnþ 1Þd21. The idea is then to compensate the extra
information available to the adversary by slightly reducing
the size of the final key. More precisely, according to the
privacy amplification theorem (Theorem 5.5.1 of [6]), the
protocol E0 obtained from E by shortening the output of the
hashing by 2log2 dimN  2ðd2  1Þlog2ðnþ 1Þ bits sat-
isfies
kðE0 F 0Þ  idKnN ðÞk1  kðE F Þ  idKn
 trN ðÞk1:
Setting  equal to H nKnN and using (5), we conclude
that kðE0 F 0Þ  idKnN ðH nKnN Þk1  ", which corre-
sponds to (4). We have thus shown that " security of E
against collective attacks implies " security of E0 against
general attacks.
In the security analysis against collective attacks, the
security parameter " can be chosen exponentially small,
i.e., "  2c2n (for some c > 0), at the only cost of
reducing the key size by an (arbitrarily small) fraction 
compared to the asymptotically optimal rate. The crucial
observation made in this Letter is that the security parame-
ter " for general attacks and " are polynomially related [see
(4)]. We thus find "  2c2nþðd21Þlog2ðnþ1Þ, which shows
that security under the assumption of collective attacks
implies full security essentially without changing the se-
curity parameter. This security estimate improves on pre-
vious estimates based on the exponential de Finetti
theorem [17]. It can be applied to the security analysis of
QKD in the practically relevant case where the capacity of
the quantum channel is small.
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Concluding remark.—The technical results in this Letter
deal with quantum states and channels that commute with
the action of the symmetric group on H n, but can be
easily generalized to the action of an arbitrary finite or
locally compact group G on a space V [18]. Seen in the
light of more general symmetry groups G, we thus hope
that our results will find fundamental applications in quan-
tum physics beyond their presented use in quantum infor-
mation theory.
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